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ABSTRACT 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT AND PROGRAM AID  
IN IMPROVING QUALITY OF LIFE 
 
By 
Jaewon Kim 
 
 The purpose of this study is to find out which aid modality between project and 
program aid is more effective for enhancing the quality of life in recipient countries with 
different levels of income. It connects the two major topics in aid effectiveness: (1) 
effectiveness of different aid modalities, and (2) aid effectiveness regarding the promotion of 
overall quality of life of the recipients. Panel data between 2004 and 2015 was used to 
compare the impact of two aid modalities on the improvement of overall welfare, and on 
economic growth, which is the traditional indicator. Results of the study indicate that it is 
recommended to give more program aid to lower middle income countries (LMICs) rather 
than least developed countries (LDCs), while LDCs are more adaptive to the project aids. 
 
Key words: Official Development Aid, Aid Effectiveness, Aid Modality, Project Aid, Program 
Aid, Budget Support, and Human Development Index
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I.  Introduction 
 Ever since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness confirmed the consensus of 
international society on the urgent need for improving aid effectiveness in 2005, it has been a 
mutual assignment for both donors and recipients to secure aid effectiveness. Considering 
that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2016 to 2030 require more commitments 
and efforts than the previous global development goals, it is essential to ensure that aid 
actually works. 
 As a part of efforts to improve aid effectiveness, there has been a growing interest 
about aid modality in recent decades. Aid modality describes ways of delivering Official 
Development Assistance (ODA): the two major modalities are project aid and program aid 
(Sumner & Mallett, 2013). Project aid is an aid providing funds and technologies for a 
specific investment, whereas program aid indicates financial support for policy-based sector-
wide investment program or overall budget (Rugare & Lee, 2016). Thus, program aid is also 
called budget support, including sector budget support and total budget support. In practice, 
project aid has always been more popular among donors. According to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Creditor Reporting System (OECD/CRS) 
database, although the recipients of the program aids are increasing, program aid has always 
been overwhelmed by projects aid in its volume. Most recently in 2016, while 147 individual 
recipients received a total of 93,302.66 million USD in project aids, 114 individual recipients 
received a total of 10,043.17 million USD in program aids.  
 One of the factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of aid is that aid is delivered 
without considering which aid modality is better for achieving its goal. The theoretical debate 
on the relative effectiveness between the project and program aid is inconclusive. There are 
criticisms on project aid because it may lead to the proliferation and fragmentation of aids 
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which feature high transaction costs and coordination burden of the recipients (Jelovac & 
Vandeninden, 2008). At the same time, due to the limited role of the recipient government, 
the donors have more control over the usage of the aid and are able to monitor the 
implementation of the activities (Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2007). On the other hand, the 
program aid is believed to increase the ownership of the recipients and predictability of aid 
inflows, and reduce the transaction costs. But it can also mean the recipients who do not put 
their priorities in development would misuse the supported budget for irrelevant purposes 
(Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2007). Empirical studies on the effectiveness of program and 
project aids have also shown mixed results (Nilsson, 2004; Dijkstra, de Kemp & Bergkamp, 
2012; Tavakoli & Smith, 2013; Rugare & Lee, 2016).  
 Another issue in aid effectiveness is how to measure the effectiveness. Most of the 
studies have measured aid effectiveness by evaluating how much aid contributes to achieving 
its ultimate goal, the development. Given this, one must start by setting an agreed definition 
of development. Following the tradition of mainstream economics that focused on 
development in terms of accumulation of wealth (Hansen & Tarp, 2000; Kim, 2016), many 
previous studies in development economics have tried to evaluate aid effectiveness by 
analyzing the relationship between aid and growth of income per capita (Burnside & Dollar, 
2000; Rugare & Lee, 2016). However, growth of income does not explain all of the various 
dimensions of development such as life expectancy, education attainment, and political 
freedom. Development should be interpreted as an expansion of freedom in one’s economic, 
social and political life (Sen, 1999). With this now more widely accepted approach, economic 
growth is not a proper criterion of development, but only a mean to achieve it. Accordingly, 
aid effectiveness should be assessed by its performance in improving the overall quality of 
life, not just per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Kosack, 2003). For instance, the 
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Human Development Index (HDI) is a good alternative for measuring the all-encompassing 
impact on living standards.  
 The ongoing debate on aid effectiveness is recently more focusing on the 
effectiveness of disaggregate aid rather than aggregate aid (Akramov, 2012), because the 
effectiveness of aggregate aid is difficult to be empirically proven. This new consensus tells 
that accumulation of precise evaluation on each disaggregate aid will eventually increase the 
overall aid effectiveness (Kim, 2016). In this context, exploring the optimal aid modality to 
make the best out of each disaggregate aid will be able to contribute to such efforts. It is even 
more crucial considering that while there have been some studies that measured aid 
effectiveness using HDI, few of them tried to distinguish the different aid modalities. 
 Therefore, this research seeks to connect the two topics under the theme of aid 
effectiveness: (1) the effectiveness of different aid modalities, and (2) aid effectiveness 
regarding promoting the overall quality of life of the recipients. The purpose of this study is 
to find out which aid modality between project and program aid is more effective for 
enhancing the quality of life in recipient countries. It also tries to examine whether the 
effectiveness of the two modalities is conditional on the level of governance and democracy 
and whether it differs depending on the level of income in the recipient countries. I use panel 
data between 2004 and 2015 to compare the impact of two aid modalities on the 
improvement of overall welfare, and on economic growth which is the traditional indicator. 
To the best of my knowledge, there has been little attempt to connect these two topics and 
compare the economic and welfare impacts of program and project aid. Thus, the result of 
this study contributes to the ongoing academic debate on aid effectiveness by filling the gap 
in the previous literature. In addition, it may help the practical policy decisions on which aid 
delivery modality is more preferable, depending on the political, institutional, and economic 
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situations in the recipient countries.  
 The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section II presents the literature review 
which covers previous studies on aid modalities and aid effectiveness for increasing quality 
of life. Section III lays out the econometric model and the data used. Section IV examines the 
results of the panel data analysis and the interpretation. Lastly, Section V concludes with the 
limitations and policy implications of the paper. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
1. Disaggregate Aid Effectiveness in its Modality 
 1.1. Background.  
The interest in the disaggregate aid effectiveness came out of the long-standing 
controversy over aid effectiveness (Tarp, 2010). Sachs (2005), one of the most renowned 
figures who have optimistic views on aid, insisted that more investment through aid will fill 
the financing gap in the recipient country, and only full-scale investment in various sectors 
(i.e., “Big Push”) will make it possible. Easterly (2006), who represents aid pessimism view, 
opposed to this “Big Push” and financing gap model and argued that aid could cause a 
negative impact on the macroeconomic development in recipient countries. Along with such 
strong conflicting views, the controversy has never been resolved, because an optimal 
methodological model to measure the aggregate aid effectiveness has not been clearly 
developed yet. Empirical studies have been challenged by complex and diverse variables that 
may affect the relationship between aid and development (Riddell, 2007; Tarp, 2010) and 
thus resulting in mixed outcomes (Hansen & Tarp, 2000). Ironically, due to the contradicting 
ideas, a new consensus has been made in the recent decades: it is necessary to focus on 
disaggregate aid effectiveness at a micro level, where we can draw more reliable and practical 
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lessons for the future aid practice (Kim, 2016). 
Aid can be disaggregated in various ways, depending on how we set the criteria. 
Some studies have focused on the different features of bilateral and multilateral aid, sorted by 
type of donors (Biscaye et al., 2017). Others have disaggregated aid effectiveness by sectors 
(Williamson, 2008; Ashford & Biswas, 2010). In the 2010s, an increasing number of micro-
level analyses have been undertaken to investigate the effectiveness of individual aid (Cohen 
& Dupas, 2010; Dupas & Robinson, 2013; Hahn, Nuzhat & Yang, 2018). Along with such 
various approaches, aid can be also classified in two ways depending on how it is delivered: 
(1) project aid which is the traditional modality, and (2) the program aid which may indicate 
the rest of the modality other than project aid, including sectoral budget support and general 
budget support (Sumner & Mallett, 2013). The rest of the section reviews previous literature 
about the effectiveness of project and program aid. 
 1.2. Theoretical studies.  
Before exploring relative effectiveness of the project and program aid in various 
situations, it is necessary to know the different features of the two aid modalities and how 
they were developed. Riddell (2007) explained that the project aid is generally “for fulfilling 
some form of ‘gap-filling’ role: providing resources, skills, and systems which the recipient 
country needs and lacks,” and therefore has “clear, tangible objectives” (p.180). This 
intervention often uses parallel financial and management system of both donor and recipient 
(Sumner & Mallett, 2013). With an increasing number of donors, an increase in the number 
of the project resulted in fragmentation of aid. The more the projects emerged, the more 
coordination burden grew on the recipient side. Eventually, it brought an increase of 
unnecessary transaction costs, especially when these projects were given through the donors’ 
financial management framework.  
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In the early 1980s, a variety of new modalities emerged including “structural 
adjustment lending, support for the private sector, NGO support, emergency assistance, and 
technical assistance and cooperation” (Robinson & Tarp, 2000, p.7), as an alternative to 
tackle the problems of traditional aid modality. After the donors realized that such adjustment 
efforts more or less failed in reforming the recipient government, they started paying 
attention to budget support from the 1990s (Mosley & Eeckhout, 2000). Especially, sectoral 
budget support attracted donors who want to encourage sound policy building in specific 
sectors in recipient countries. Since it was designed in an attempt to overcome the 
shortcomings of project aid, program aid is usually delivered through the local ministry of 
finance, to increase the aggregate volume of spending, to improve the predictability of aid 
(Riddell, 2007), and to enhance the coordination between donors and recipients (de Haan & 
Everest-Phillips, 2010). Recently in 2005, at the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, more 
than 100 donors and recipients selected the use of programme-based approaches (PBA) as 
one of the indicators to implement the five principles of the Declaration (OECD, 2008). PBA, 
the indicator nine was selected based on the third principle, harmonization of donor practices. 
In their assessment, OECD (2011) explained the reason why the use of PBA was selected as 
the indicator to improve harmonization is that it ensures the use of partner countries systems 
for planning, funding, and following government activities. By taking this approach, the 
donor and the recipient are expected to rely on a single budget framework, which increases 
the recipient’s ownership and leadership, as well as reduces the aid fragmentation.  
 Given this historical background where program aid was induced as an alternative of 
project aid, many studies that explored the effectiveness of the two aid modalities examined 
whether program aid is superior to the project aid.  
 The study of Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2007) was one of the first studies to 
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investigate the relative effectiveness of project aid and conditional budget support. In their 
theoretical model, they showed that it is better to give budget support than project aid when 
there is an alignment in preferences of donors and recipients, and when the aid flow is 
relatively smaller than the local resources of the recipients. In their point of view, the 
preferences of the recipients are key factors that determine the success of any aid, which are 
sometimes not aligned with the priorities of the donors. To backup these points, they covered 
the shortcomings of conditional budget support and project aid. When it comes to budget 
support, its effectiveness depends on the donor’s ability to monitor whether the budget is used 
for the agreed purpose. In this situation, inefficiency may occur if donors allocate more 
resources to tangible items which they can control and monitor, rather than considering the 
substantial needs. Such evaluation oriented allocation practice may weaken the funding for 
genuine and substantial development priorities, and eventually hinder the effectiveness of the 
aid. The challenge associated with the monitoring can become harsher when the preferences 
of the donors and the recipients are far apart. In their model, the developmental preferences 
of recipient countries were proxied by the level of the policy environment. If the recipient 
does not have a good policy environment, they are likely to divert the budget support and 
consume it as they wish, in a non-development-oriented purpose. In this case, it is 
recommended to give project aid. 
With a similar model, Jelovac and Vandeninden (2008) also suggested the optimal aid 
is the unconditional budget support, but conditionality can also improve the aid effectiveness 
with the recipient governments who meet certain parameters: high developmental priorities, 
high productivity of the inputs, and a high level of aid compared to the recipient’s budget. 
This means conditionality works only when the recipient government is capable of fulfilling 
the conditionality, and when the aid amount is large enough to induce the recipient to meet 
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the conditionality. 
 Regarding project aid, Jelovac and Vandeninden (2008) explained that project aid 
inherently requires transaction cost for coordination between a donor and a recipient, and 
limited harmonization and lack of coordination will increase the transaction cost. Because of 
this, all aid should be given in the form of program aid. 
       Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2007) indicated another risk of project aid. They said 
project aid always carries a risk of fungibility, meaning the crowding out effect of the 
developmental budget that the recipient government would have used if the aid was not given. 
The project aid flow is fungible as much as the recipient can divert its resources other than 
developmental purposes. Therefore, they argued aid is more fungible with smaller projects, 
which is why the results of relatively large project aids are superior. 
 Both studies (Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2007; Jelovac & Vandeninden, 2008) have 
same limitations that they only relied on the simple variation of the Cobb-Douglas model and 
did not conduct an empirical analysis. Without considering a variety of restrictions and 
variables that may affect the actual implementation and achievement of project and program 
aid, such theoretical approach cannot fully illustrate the status quo of aid delivery. 
 1.3. Empirical studies.  
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of each aid modality showed mixed results. 
Riddell (2007) noted that although project aid is losing its credibility in terms of its 
effectiveness, nonetheless, the records of project aid have been highly successful. By 
reviewing thousands of project completion reports, written by both donors and recipients, 
Riddell (2007) showed they achieved their immediate goals in 70 to 85 percent of the cases, 
especially when they had set tangible objectives. This indicates that with a clear objective, 
project aid can be an effective prescription to meet specific development needs within a short 
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term. Yet, the fact that most of the reports did not contain the long-term impacts of the 
projects implies that project aid lacks sustained impact. 
 de Haan and Everest-Phillops (2010) discussed implications for both practice and 
theory on the effectiveness of program aid, focusing on the Joint Evaluation of General 
Budget Support 2004-06. The joint evaluation was conducted for cases from Burkina Faso, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam, and the separate 
evaluation for the case of Tanzania. In these countries, the Partnership General Budget 
Support (PGBS) programmes were implemented, which were long-term budget supports with 
active policy dialogue for strengthening the recipient government policy for poverty 
reduction. The result indicated that there were small but positive impacts: PGBS helped 
effective allocation of the public budget by reducing transaction costs and increasing 
discretion of governments. It also offered a forum to consolidate the rules of different donors 
and made the financial and operational arrangement evolve. Net benefits were greater in 
countries where PGBS programmes were implemented for a longer period of time. The 
literature also covered how this result can be understood in theory. By ensuring that there will 
be a continuous budget flow, PGBS increased entitlements of the recipient governments that 
encouraged their policy development and harmonization in a donor-recipient relationship. 
Although this research contributed to the debate over the effectiveness of program aid, the 
limited source of analysis did not allow them to expand the discussion out of the boundary of 
PGBS programmes. 
 Most recently, based on these theoretical and empirical achievements of the previous 
literature, Rugare and Lee (2016) explored the relative effectiveness of program and project 
aid in 41 Sub-Sahara African countries, to which this research owes a great deal. They 
measured aid effectiveness by examining the impact of aid on increasing the GDP per capita, 
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using the actual disbursement data of program and project aid for 2006-2014. To address the 
potential endogeneity of aid variables, they estimated the same growth model twice, once 
with average data of 2 five-year periods for all variables, and secondly with one year lagged 
data for project and program aids. Other than the amount of each aid modality as a percentage 
of GDP, they also included control variables such as Policy, proxied by Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index, gross investment, total exports and imports, life 
expectancy, and primary education enrollment. To determine whether the effectiveness of 
program and project aid is conditional on sound policies and institutions, they created an 
interaction term between Policy and each aid modality. 
 As a result, they showed that program aid promoted economic growth with 
diminishing marginal returns on growth, and the sound policy and institutional environment 
was not a necessary condition for both modalities. They also found project aid on its own had 
no significant impact on the economic growth but had a negative impact on per capita 
economic growth when interacted with policy and institutions. This could be interpreted as 
inefficiency caused by parallel financial systems; when the recipient county’s macroeconomic 
institutions are already firmly established, the project aid can be ineffective because of using 
parallel financial systems. Hence, they concluded with a policy prescription that development 
countries in Sub Saharan Africa should induce more program aid for their economic growth. 
 On a firm ground of existing theoretical debate on the effectiveness of different aid 
modalities, Rugare and Lee (2016) used an actual disbursement data of large number of 
panels contributed to evaluating the effectiveness of the recent practices in international aid 
allocation. However, because they conducted their analysis only with the countries in Sub 
Saharan Africa, their result does not fully represent the whole recipients in the world. Also, 
by measuring the effectiveness of the economic growth only, they could not grasp the 
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comprehensive and aggregated impact of aid.  
 1.4. Contributions and limitations.  
Although there is not a vast literature yet, the studies on aid modalities are gradually 
being accumulated. The interests in this area were originated from the big wave on aid 
effectiveness discourse, more specifically from the recent focus on the disaggregate aid 
effectiveness. The empirical studies on the effectiveness of each modality were developed by 
theoretical studies and the Paris Declaration, to meet the urgent global needs for improving 
aid effectiveness for both donors and recipients. Despite such contribution, the fact that most 
of the literature focused on economic impact of aid but not on its welfare impact gives more 
space to develop for future researchers. 
2. Aid and Development 
 2.1. Background.  
How we measure the impact of aid depends on how we define its goal, the 
development. The conception of development has become encompassing and wider over the 
last few decades. Sen (1999) is the most renowned figure who brought up the discussion on 
the wider conception of development, by demonstrating that wealth itself is not an ultimate 
goal of development, but only a method to allow us to have substantive freedoms. According 
to him, “Expansion of freedom is viewed ... both as the primary end and as the principal 
means of development.” (Sen, 1999, p. 12) On this theoretical basis, the Human Development 
Report was first published in 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
and its index, HDI, is in increasing usage by researchers who connect the idea of aid 
effectiveness and its ability in improving the quality of life. By quoting Sen (1999), Kosack 
(2003) criticized that most of the previous studies which only focused on the economic 
impact of aids, and measured aid effectiveness using growth of HDI in his study. Fraser-
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Moleketi and Argyriades (2010) also clarified that the narrow definition of development has 
an inherent limitation and that HDI is one measure to correct that. Hwang, Park, Lee & Lim 
(2016) used HDI as well in their study and warned that understanding the goal of aid as 
economic growth can be dangerous because such approach would evaluate many aid 
programmes as a failure, especially when those are not directly targeting economic growth. 
2.2. Aid effectiveness in human development.  
In order to illustrate the long-term effect of aid on a country’s sustainable 
development, Kosack (2003) conducted an empirical analysis using panel data of aid amount 
and HDI growth from 1974 to 1985. He showed aid has a positive effect on increasing the 
HDI of recipient countries, only when combined with a good level of democracy. To test his 
hypothesis that aid is effective in democratized countries, he used an interaction term 
between aid as a percentage of GDP and the level of democracy. For democracy, he adopted 
two types of proxies: (1) the POLITY index from Polity IV project, which evaluates the level 
of democratization in a country by assessing the process of regime transition, and (2) the 
freedom scale from the Freedom House. As a result of the analysis, the coefficient of this 
interaction term was positive and highly significant, indicating that aid has a positive impact 
on improving quality of life in democracies, but may bring opposite results in autocracies. 
 He also figured out that in most cases democracies are more likely to have a poor 
quality of life compared to autocracies. If started from a same economic condition, an 
autocracy will grow faster than a democracy, because autocracies would focus their resources 
on the areas with the highest return, rather than pay attention to the needs of the public. In 
autocracies, the wealth is concentrated in the elites, the most productive members who make 
the economy grow more efficiently. Nevertheless, aid can reverse this tendency. Democratic 
governments tend to treat their people better than autocracies, so only if they have sufficient 
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resources, they would transfer their resources into increases in living standards. In this sense, 
Kosack (2003) argued that aid that flows into democracies will create a meaningful 
improvement in the living standards of their people. 
 Without a doubt, his research made a substantial contribution to the ongoing 
discussion on aid effectiveness by using growth of HDI as a dependent variable. Especially, 
he made the first attempt to check how democracy may alter the aid effectiveness on quality 
of life. The fact that he only used the aggregated aid amount, however, gave more space to 
develop in the future studies. 
 Regarding such limitation, Assima and Quartey (2009) were the researchers who went 
further from what Kosack (2003) achieved. They also agreed that the current debate on aid 
effectiveness should be shifted from the traditional analysis of the aid-growth relationship, 
and investigated the aid’s impact on welfare in 39 Sub-Saharan African countries. Unlike 
Kosack (2003), they used different subsets of aid, such as aggregated bilateral aid and 
program aid – a type of disaggregate aid. Also, they used infant mortality rate as well as HDI 
as dependent variables. Their findings showed that aggregate bilateral aid did not have a 
significant effect on HDI and infant mortality rate. On the contrary, the sector-specific aid 
and program aid had a significant and positive impact on HDI, but no significant effect on 
infant mortality rate. Considering this, they recommended that the amount of aid must be 
scaled up including program aid for further development of this stagnated region. Although 
their study did not directly compare the relative effectiveness of program and project aid, nor 
did cover all of the regions, it contributed to the ongoing studies on effectiveness of the new 
aid modality. 
 A recent study of Biscaye, Reynolds, and Anderson (2017) tried to overcome the 
inconclusive results of empirical studies in aid effectiveness, by reviewing 45 empirical 
14 
 
studies that tested the relations between aids and a variety of progress in development 
including GDP growth, human development indicators, governance indicators, and non-aid 
investment. They suggested that using a single indicator such as GDP growth alone cannot 
fully illustrate the multi-dimensional outcomes of aid. They also found that the effectiveness 
of bilateral and multilateral aid can be affected by some factors including the regional 
characteristics of the recipients, periods of observation, the objective of the programmes, and 
the features of the aid agencies. Thus, they reached an inconclusive conclusion that there is 
no significant evidence to say bilateral aid is more effective than multilateral aid. In this 
regard, they clarified that future research in this field should pay more attention to the details 
of the aid flow such as different transaction costs that may cause inefficiency, rather than 
focusing onto the aggregated aid amount of these channels.  
 2.3. Contributions and limitations.  
As the conception of development evolved, some studies on aid effectiveness also 
adopted a new indicator to assess whether aid worked or not. These studies argued that those 
approaches that focus on GDP cannot thoroughly evaluate the impact of aid, especially when 
the aid is targeting to improve the welfare of the recipients. Most of the literature used 
aggregate aid data, which could not respond to the recent voices that request more 
disaggregated analysis on aid effectiveness.  
3. Summary and Future Research Implications 
Summing up the literature review, the studies on different aid modalities are active but 
require more experiments. Most of the studies examined aid effectiveness using an economic 
growth indicator, and only a part of them conducted both theoretical and empirical analysis. 
There is increasing use of HDI and welfare indicators in the area of aid effectiveness, but 
many of them did not focus on aid modalities. Also, some of those studies restricted the 
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region of interest in Sub Saharan Africa. Still, most studies aggregate the recipient countries. 
It would be useful to disaggregate the recipient countries into the least developed countries 
(LDCs) and lower middle-income countries (LMICs), because aid effectiveness may differ 
depending on the level of development or income. Therefore, based on the context and 
progress in the literature, this research aims to link the two topics by exploring the relative 
effectiveness of program and project aid for improving HDI in the OECD/DAC recipient 
countries with different levels of development. We can summarize the working hypothesis to 
be tested as follows: The program aid is more effective in promoting the quality of life in aid 
recipient countries with different levels of income. 
 
III.  Research Method 
1. Construction of the Panel Data 
I conduct a panel data analysis using data with 288 observations from 24 countries 
who received both project and program aid annually from 2004 to 2015. Table 1 shows the 
summary statistics of the variables. The variable Q represents HDI which is between 0 and 1. 
It indicates the overall quality of life in a country, by aggregating the level of its health, 
education, and income. The higher HDI means, the better quality of life. The variable Proj 
and Prog represent the amount of aid received in each modality, as a percentage of GDP. The 
variable Gov is proxied by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which is a summary 
of six different dimensions of governance. In this research, I use the average value of each 
dimension of WGI, and adjust its range to 0 to 5 scale, from its original scale which is -2.5 to 
2.5. The higher value indicates better level of governance. The variable Dem is proxied by 
POLITY Index from Polity IV project. Again, I adjust its range to 0 to 20 scale, from its 
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original -10 to 10 scale, following the study of Kosack (2003) who used the same value. The 
lowest value, 0 means successive monarchy and 20 means full-fledged democracy.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variables Note N mean sd min max 
Q HDI 288 0.510 0.116 0.278 0.769
G log GDP per capita 288 6.708 0.817 4.848 8.396
q_int initial HDI 288 0.466 0.121 0.278 0.703
g_int initial log GDP per capita 288 6.116 0.692 4.848 7.589
Proj project aid/GDP 288 0.0438 0.0347 0.00220 0.221
Prog program aid/GDP 288 0.0152 0.0145 2.77e-07 0.0753
Gov Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 288 2.014 0.389 1.044 3.071
Dem POLITY Index 288 13.61 4.835 3 20 
Fdi foreign direct invest 288 1,008 1,713 -40.70 11,800
Rem personal remittances 288 1,269 2,750 0.0100 19,306
Hiv HIV/AIDS prevalence 288 2.907 4.090 0.100 14.10
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Table 2: Correlation between explanatory variables of Model (1A) 
q_int Proj Prog Gov Dem Fdi Rem Hiv 
 
q_int 1.0000 
 
 
Proj -0.4566* 1.0000 
 0.0000 
 
Prog -0.4298* 0.4756* 1.0000
 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Gov 0.3449* 1.0000
 0.0000 
 
Dem 0.3992* 1.0000
 0.0000
 
Fdi 0.2059* -0.1644* -0.1585* -0.3321* 1.0000
 0.0004 0.0052 0.007 0.0000
 
Rem 0.2754* -0.2858* -0.2943* -0.2013* -0.1987* 0.5822* 1.0000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.0000
 
Hiv -0.3330* 0.1634* 0.3092* 0.1299* -0.2525* 1.0000
 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0275 0.0000 
                          
Notes: All values are significant (p<.05). 
* p <0.01 
 
Table 3: Collinearity between explanatory variables of Model (1A) 
Variable  VIF  1/VIF  
    
 Rem 1.95 0.513022 
 q_int  1.88 0.531805 
 Fdi  1.86 0.537342 
Gov  1.65 0.607276 
Prog  1.49 0.673313 
Proj  1.48 0.673562 
Dem  1.41 0.710799 
Hiv  1.33 0.753189 
Mean VIF  1.63 
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2. Models of analysis 
2.1. Effectiveness of project and program aid.  
The major research question of this study is whether the sector-wide programs 
(budget support) have a better impact on the human development of the recipients compared 
to the project aids. Model (1A) below is the main regression equation in this study. 
 
ሺ1𝐴ሻ  𝑄௜௧ ൌ  𝛼  ൅ 𝑞_𝑖𝑛𝑡௜𝛽଴  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝛽ଵ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ 𝛽ଶ ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧ଶ𝛽ଷ ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ଶ𝛽ସ ൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽ହ  
൅  𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧ 𝛽଺  ൅ 𝐹𝑑𝑖௜௧𝛽଻ ൅ 𝑅𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽଼ ൅ 𝐻𝑖𝑣௜௧𝛽ଽ ൅ 𝜀௜௧ 
 
     Where 
     𝑄௜௧ is quality of life in a recipient country i in year t, as proxied by Human 
Development Index (HDI) from (United Nations Development Programme, 
UNDP) 
     𝑞_𝑖𝑛𝑡 is an initial value of HDI in the year 2004 
     𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗 is project aid received as percentage of GDP obtained from OECD/CRS 
     𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔 is program aid received as percentage of GDP obtained from OECD/CRS 
     𝐺𝑜𝑣 is a level of public policy and institution as proxied by of Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) from the World Bank 
     𝐷𝑒𝑚 is a level of democratization as proxied by POLITY Index from Polity IV Project  
     𝐹𝑑𝑖 is net foreign direct invest inflow sourced from the World Bank 
     𝑅𝑒𝑚 is personal remittances sourced from the World Bank 
     𝐻𝑖𝑣 is prevalence of HIV/AIDS sourthe ced from the World Bank 
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In Model (1A), I use the absolute HDI value, following the previous literature 
(Gomanee, Girma, & Morrissey, 2003; Hwang et al., 2016) that explored aid effectiveness for 
improving welfare. Additionally, I use aid amount as percentage of GDP, same as in many 
aid-related studiess (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Kosack, 2003; Asiama & Quartey, 2009; 
Rugare & Lee, 2016). Following a recent trend (Rugare & Lee, 2016; Hwang et al., 2016; 
Galiani et al., 2017), I use net disbursement amount instead of the commitment amount of aid. 
Here 𝐺𝑜𝑣  and 𝐷𝑒𝑚  are taken to describe different aspects of political and 
institutional environment in a recipient country, both of which are widely used by many 
studies covering relationship between aid effectiveness and recipients’ characteristics (Boone, 
1996; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Kosack, 2003; Asongu, 2015; Rugare & Lee, 2016; Hwang 
et al., 2016), often with different proxies. The variable 𝐺𝑜𝑣 represents the aggregate level of 
governance including the level of macroeconomic policy and institutional environment of one 
country. Whereas, the variable 𝐷𝑒𝑚, proxied by the POLITY Index from the Polity IV 
Project, only focuses on the whether the transition of the regimes was conducted in a 
democratic way or not.  
Model (1B) below examined the aid effectiveness of each aid modality on economic 
growth in order to compare the traditional approach and the main equation. 
 
ሺ1𝐵ሻ  𝐺௜௧ ൌ  𝛼  ൅ 𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑡௜𝛽଴  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝛽ଵ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ 𝛽ଶ ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧ଶ𝛽ଷ ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ଶ𝛽ସ ൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽ହ  
൅  𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧ 𝛽଺  ൅ 𝐹𝑑𝑖௜௧𝛽଻ ൅ 𝑅𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽଼ ൅ 𝐻𝑖𝑣௜௧𝛽ଽ ൅ 𝜀௜௧ 
 
Where 
𝐺௜௧ is a logarithm of per capita GDP of a recipient country i in year t 
𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑡 is a logarithm of the initial value of per capita GDP in year 2004 
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I use the logarithm of per capita GDP throughout the entire paper, in consideration of 
the difference in scale between it and other the variables. Same as many studies that explored 
aid’s impact on economic growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Rugare & Lee, 2016), I include 
the logarithm of initial per capita GDP to control the impact of initial income gap.  
Although many growth studies used growth rate of GDP per capita as their dependent 
variable (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Rugare & Lee, 2016; Hwang et al., 2016), in this paper, I 
use the logarithm of per capita GDP, following other studies (Irfan & Nehra, 2016; Galiani et 
al., 2016). The rest of the explanatory variables are the same as in Model (1A). 
2.2. Effectiveness of project and program aid conditional on governance. 
Model (2A) and (2B) are variations of Model (1A) and (1B) for testing whether the 
effectiveness of project and program aid differs depending on the good level of governance. 
The only difference from Model (1A) and (1B) is that interaction terms between aid and 
governance are included in Model (2A) and (2B). 
 
ሺ2𝐴ሻ  𝑄௜௧ ൌ  𝛼  ൅ 𝑞௜௡௧௜𝛽଴  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽ଵ  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽ଶ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝛽ଷ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ 𝛽ସ  
൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧ଶ𝛽ହ ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ଶ𝛽଺ ൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽଻  ൅  𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧ 𝛽଼  ൅ 𝐹𝑑𝑖௜௧𝛽ଽ ൅ 𝑅𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଵ଴ ൅ 𝐻𝑖𝑣௜௧𝛽ଵଵ ൅ 𝜀௜௧ 
 
     Same as in Model (1B), I test the equation with log GDP per capita as a dependent 
variable and an initial economic level as one of the control variables in Model (2B). 
 
ሺ2𝐵ሻ  𝐺௜௧ ൌ  𝛼  ൅ 𝑔௜௡௧௜𝛽଴  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽ଵ  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽ଶ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝛽ଷ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ 𝛽ସ  
൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧ଶ𝛽ହ ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ଶ𝛽଺ ൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽଻  ൅  𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧ 𝛽଼  ൅ 𝐹𝑑𝑖௜௧𝛽ଽ ൅ 𝑅𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଵ଴ ൅ 𝐻𝑖𝑣௜௧𝛽ଵଵ ൅ 𝜀௜௧ 
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2.3. Effectiveness of project aid program aid conditional on democracy. 
Model (3A) and (3B) are another variations of Model (1A) and (1B) for testing 
whether the effectiveness of project and program aid differs depending on the good level of 
democracy. Here, interaction terms between aid and democracy are included. 
 
ሺ3𝐴ሻ  𝑄௜௧ ൌ  𝛼  ൅ 𝑞௜௡௧௜𝛽଴  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଵ  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଶ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝛽ଷ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ 𝛽ସ  
൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧ଶ𝛽ହ ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ଶ𝛽଺ ൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽଻  ൅  𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧ 𝛽଼  ൅ 𝐹𝑑𝑖௜௧𝛽ଽ ൅ 𝑅𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଵ଴ ൅ 𝐻𝑖𝑣௜௧𝛽ଵଵ ൅ 𝜀௜௧ 
 
     Same as in Model (1B) and (2B), I use log GDP per capita and an initial economic 
level in Model (3B). 
 
ሺ3𝐵ሻ  𝐺௜௧ ൌ  𝛼  ൅ 𝑔௜௡௧௜𝛽଴  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଵ  ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଶ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧𝛽ଷ  ൅  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ 𝛽ସ  
൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗௜௧ଶ𝛽ହ ൅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔௜௧ଶ𝛽଺ ൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣௜௧𝛽଻  ൅  𝐷𝑒𝑚௜௧ 𝛽଼  ൅ 𝐹𝑑𝑖௜௧𝛽ଽ ൅ 𝑅𝑒𝑚௜௧𝛽ଵ଴ ൅ 𝐻𝑖𝑣௜௧𝛽ଵଵ ൅ 𝜀௜௧ 
 
In this research, each model was estimated twice. In the first analysis, I use annual 
data for all variables. In the second analysis, I divide the data into 3 four-year periods (2004-
2007, 2008-2011, and 2012-2015) and use the average data for all variables.  
 
IV.  Results and Discussion 
All Models were tested in a fixed effect model and random effect model, followed by 
a Hausman test for each equation. All of the results from Hausman tests allowed the 
researcher to reject the null hypothesis (p < .05) and to select the fixed effect model. The 
same dataset was also analyzed by income level in two groups – LDCs and LMICs. Table 4 is 
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the result of using all observations, and Table 5 and 6 are the results of LDCs and LMICs, 
respectively. 
 In the fixed effect model, the time-invariant variables, such as the initial GDP per 
capita (g_int) and the initial HDI (q_int) were omitted due to collinearity. Also, after running 
Model (1A) and (1B), I adjusted the remaining models; in Model (2A) and (2B), the variable 
ProjxGov was eliminated, and Model (3A) and (3B) was not tested at all. This adjustment 
was made for two reasons: (1) The coefficients of project aid in Model (1A) and (1B) were 
already significant and positive, so it was not necessary to create an interaction term with 
project aid. (2) Another variable of interest, program aid showed negative or insignificant 
coefficients in Model (1A) and (1B), so the interaction term with program aid was still 
necessary to see if it is effective under certain conditions. However, because the coefficients 
of democracy were insignificant in Model (1A) and (1B), an interaction with democracy was 
not necessary to be tested. 
In Table 4, project and program aid show opposite direction of coefficients. Project 
aid shows a significantly positive impact in improving both HDI and log GDP per capita. Its 
squared terms has negative coefficients in all estimations, meaning that project aid has a 
marginal diminishing return on human development and economic growth. The overall 
tendency is similar in Table 5 and 6, with some difference between LDCs and LMICs. The 
effect of project aid in HDI is bigger in LDCs, compared to LMICs, but its economic growth 
impact is bigger in LMICs. This can be caused by two reasons: (1) LDC’s have more room to 
improve their HDI, and (2) LDCs require more resources to achieve economic growth, 
compared to LMICs, because of their weak economic fundamentals. The fact that the 
estimations with LMICs show almost twice higher governance level, compared to LDCs, 
supports this explanation. 
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Table 4: Results of Model (1A), (1B), (2A), and (2B) using annual data 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Model (1A) Model (1B) Model (2A) Model (2B) 
    
Proj 0.972*** 11.39*** 0.956*** 11.28*** 
(0.0996) (1.508) (0.0998) (1.517) 
Prog -0.347* -10.02*** -1.076** -15.43** 
(0.200) (3.034) (0.491) (7.456) 
Proj2 -2.800*** -45.16*** -2.770*** -44.93*** 
(0.538) (8.147) (0.537) (8.158) 
Prog2 0.369 74.91 1.400 82.56 
(3.295) (49.88) (3.345) (50.84) 
ProgxGov 0.339 2.518 
(0.209) (3.172) 
Gov 0.0207*** 0.576*** 0.0155** 0.538*** 
(0.00663) (0.100) (0.00734) (0.112) 
Dem 0.000123 0.00140 0.000210 0.00205 
(0.000562) (0.00851) (0.000563) (0.00855) 
Fdi 3.40e-06*** 7.93e-05*** 3.62e-06*** 8.09e-05*** 
(9.84e-07) (1.49e-05) (9.90e-07) (1.50e-05) 
Rem 4.25e-06*** 6.26e-05*** 4.23e-06*** 6.25e-05*** 
(6.98e-07) (1.06e-05) (6.96e-07) (1.06e-05) 
Hiv -0.0251*** -0.127*** -0.0250*** -0.126*** 
(0.00270) (0.0408) (0.00269) (0.0409) 
Constant 0.502*** 5.500*** 0.511*** 5.569*** 
(0.0179) (0.271) (0.0187) (0.285) 
     
Observations 288 288 288 288 
R-squared 0.736 0.588 0.739 0.589 
Number of id 24 24 24 24 
F 79.10 40.51 71.92 36.47 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Hausman) 
chi2 64.54 14.38 67.51 21.86 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
q_int and g_int are omitted due to the collinearity. 
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On the other hand, program aid showed negative or insignificant impacts for HDI 
improvement and a significantly negative impact on economic growth in Table 4. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms between program and governance are positive but 
insignificant. Same as with project aid, the effectiveness of program aid showed different 
features, depending on the recipients’ income level. Table 5 shows that the negative impact of 
program aid was generally significant in LDCs, whereas Table 6 indicates its negative impact 
is only significant with Model (2B), in terms of economic growth. The interaction between 
program aid and governance also has a significant and positive impact only with Model (2B) 
in LMICs. Still, the net marginal effect of program aid for economic growth in LMICs 
remains negative (-49.80+20.12). 
 There can be several reasons for the insignificant or negative effect of the program 
aid. Firstly, it can be a reflection of practical constraints on the ability of recipient 
governments to manage and absorb the budget-supports efficiently and effectively (OECD, 
2011). The fact that the negative coefficients of program aid are generally more significant in 
LDCs compared to LMICs also supports this reasoning. Considering that the LDCs on 
average lack sound macroeconomic policy and financial institutions, the negative impact of 
program aid could have been bigger in this group. Secondly, because most of the program aid 
are commonly provided with conditionality, it may also negatively affect the effectiveness of 
program aid if the recipients have difficulties in meeting the conditionality. The significantly 
negative coefficient of program aid in LDCs could have been caused due to the lack of 
capability of LDCs to meet such conditionality. 
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Table 5: Results of Model (1A), (1B), (2A), and (2B) using annual data  
- subsample of LDCs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Model (1A) Model (1B) Model (2A) Model (2B) 
Proj 0.986*** 7.894*** 0.938*** 7.506*** 
(0.133) (1.809) (0.136) (1.863) 
Prog -0.528** -9.370*** -1.329** -15.85* 
(0.238) (3.237) (0.587) (8.029) 
Proj2 -2.386*** -26.85*** -2.241*** -25.67*** 
(0.642) (8.745) (0.647) (8.852) 
Prog2 2.549 75.37 3.242 80.97 
(3.674) (50.06) (3.689) (50.50) 
Gov 0.0240*** 0.535*** 0.0162* 0.473*** 
(0.00799) (0.109) (0.00950) (0.130) 
Dem -2.43e-05 0.00173 0.000188 0.00345 
(0.000860) (0.0117) (0.000869) (0.0119) 
Fdi 3.42e-06* 8.10e-05*** 4.05e-06** 8.61e-05*** 
(1.78e-06) (2.43e-05) (1.82e-06) (2.50e-05) 
Rem 4.42e-05*** 0.000515*** 4.38e-05*** 0.000512*** 
(6.51e-06) (8.87e-05) (6.49e-06) (8.89e-05) 
Hiv -0.0162*** -0.0777* -0.0165*** -0.0802* 
(0.00321) (0.0438) (0.00321) (0.0439) 
ProgxGov 0.402 3.254 
(0.269) (3.688) 
Constant 0.411*** 5.149*** 0.426*** 5.273*** 
(0.0254) (0.346) (0.0273) (0.373) 
     
Observations 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.793 0.613 0.796 0.615 
Number of id 15 15 15 15 
F 66.43 27.45 60.48 24.74 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Hausman) 
chi2 28.31 25.29 29.03 34.69 
Prob > chi2 0.0002 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
q_int and g_int are omitted due to the collinearity. 
 
  
26 
 
 
Table 6: Results of Model (1A), (1B), (2A), and (2B) using annual data  
- subsample of LMICs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Model (1A) Model (1B) Model (2A) Model (2B) 
     
Proj 0.699*** 16.81*** 0.692*** 15.34*** 
(0.148) (3.762) (0.151) (3.745) 
Prog -0.119 -12.74 -0.303 -49.80** 
(0.344) (8.746) (0.764) (18.94) 
Proj2 -2.754** -93.15*** -2.709** -84.02*** 
(1.059) (26.96) (1.078) (26.74) 
Prog2 1.522 206.6 -0.237 -149.1 
(10.32) (262.6) (12.26) (304.0) 
ProgxGov 0.0995 20.12** 
(0.370) (9.173) 
Gov 0.0487*** 0.949*** 0.0481*** 0.835*** 
(0.00816) (0.208) (0.00847) (0.210) 
Dem -0.000377 -0.00286 -0.000377 -0.00292 
(0.000451) (0.0115) (0.000454) (0.0112) 
Fdi 2.08e-06*** 6.43e-05*** 2.09e-06*** 6.61e-05*** 
(7.34e-07) (1.87e-05) (7.39e-07) (1.83e-05) 
Rem 4.25e-06*** 5.31e-05*** 4.25e-06*** 5.36e-05*** 
(4.42e-07) (1.12e-05) (4.44e-07) (1.10e-05) 
Hiv -0.0304*** -0.241* -0.0304*** -0.252** 
(0.00483) (0.123) (0.00486) (0.121) 
Constant 0.522*** 5.127*** 0.523*** 5.365*** 
(0.0185) (0.470) (0.0191) (0.473) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.831 0.682 0.831 0.699 
Number of id 9 9 9 9 
F 49.23 21.49 43.85 20.64 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Hausman) 
chi2 55.01 49.67 53.78 48.33 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
q_int and g_int are omitted due to the collinearity. 
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Overall, the effectiveness of project and program aid did not change much depending 
on the different dependent variables: HDI and log GDP per capita. On the theoretical 
background of the wider definition of development, the Models in this research were 
designed to show that the HDI-measure is superior to the GDP per capita-measure for 
evaluating aid effectiveness. These two measures are generally expected to be different from 
each other, because HDI requires longer period to change, while GDP can be more sensitive 
to the amount of aids and change within a relatively short time. The little difference in this 
dataset can be explained that it may indicate the number of observations was more or less 
adequate to capture long-term changes since it was collected from a reasonably long period – 
twelve years. 
After running the analysis using annual data, I estimate the Models using average 
period data to eliminate excessive fluctuations in the dependent and independent variables, 
same as in the study of Rugare and Lee (2016). I divide the dataset into three four-year 
periods: 2004-2007, 2008-2011, and 2012-2015. I transform all of the variables into average 
period values, except the initial GDP per capita and initial HDI. Table 7 shows that the 
overall results with average period data has a similar tendency to those with the annual data, 
except that the results of Hausman tests supported the random effect model (p < .01). Also, 
the overall significance levels drop. This may have been caused by the reduced number of 
observations and declined variation of all variables, by taking the period average values. As 
seen in Table 7, the period-average dataset produces insignificant coefficients for most of the 
variables, although the signs of the coefficients are almost similar to those in Table 4. 
Because both governance and democracy in Model (1A) are found insignificant, the Model 
(2A) and (3A) are not tested. 
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Table 7: Result of Model (1A) and (1B) using period-avearge data 
Variables (1) (2) Model (1A) Model (1B) 
   
q_int 0.983*** 
(0.0382) 
Proj 1.541*** 16.83*** 
(0.275) (4.096) 
Prog -1.131 -25.20** 
(0.771) (11.50) 
Proj2 -4.288** -71.08*** 
(1.681) (25.08) 
Prog2 3.946 262.4 
(13.03) (194.4) 
Gov 0.00735 0.240 
(0.0102) (0.171) 
Dem -0.000394 -0.0138 
(0.000830) (0.0134) 
Fdi 3.56e-06 6.18e-05* 
(2.16e-06) (3.24e-05) 
Rem 2.58e-06* 2.23e-05 
(1.36e-06) (2.09e-05) 
Hiv 0.000457 -0.0109 
(0.000923) (0.0139) 
g_int 1.019*** 
(0.117) 
Constant -0.00410 -0.116 
(0.0232) (0.592) 
Observations 72 72 
Number of id 24 24 
Wald chi2 1255.19 248.61 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
(Hausman) 
chi2 10.08 4.57 
Prob > chi2 0.1838 0.7120 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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V.  Conclusion 
Summing up, this study conducted an empirical analysis using a balanced panel data 
from 2004 to 2015, in order to measure the relative effectiveness of the project and program 
aid in improving quality of life in recipient countries. Based on a wide theoretical consensus 
that the development implies comprehensive freedom rather than mere economic growth, this 
research urged that aid effectiveness should be assessed based on its ability to enhance the 
overall welfare of the recipients rather than the income growth. In alignment with the recent 
literature that emphasized the importance of disaggregate aid effectiveness (Quattara & Strobl, 
2004; Kim, 2016), this research also tried to find out whether the project and program aid 
have different impacts on the quality of life, proxied by HDI.  
The findings of this study show that project aid has a strongly significant and positive 
impact in improving quality of life and economic growth in aid recipient countries. On the 
contrary, program aid on its own has a negative or insignificant impact on economic growth 
and quality of life. In the income level analysis, dividing the sample into LDCs and LMICs, 
project aid had greater welfare impact but a smaller economic impact in LDCs. Program aid 
was generally negative for both welfare and economic growth in LDCs, but mostly 
insignificant in LMICs. The impact of governance in HDI and log GDP per capita was almost 
twice higher in LDCs compared to LMICs. Therefore, the difference in relative aid 
effectiveness between LDCs and LMICs may have been caused by lack of macroeconomic 
fundamentals and governance level in LDCs. This result suggests that the relative 
effectiveness of the project and program aid may differ depending on the local governance 
level, consistent with theoretical studies in the features of different aid modalities (Cordella & 
Dell’Ariccia, 2007; Jelovac & Vandenindem, 2008). 
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One of the limitations of this study is that the size of the panel data is relatively small. 
Also, the number of explanatory variables is not large enough to control the factors that may 
affect the HDI or income. In addition, although the panel analysis in fixed effect model may 
weaken the endogeneity issue, the results may become more reliable if more elaborated 
metrics were used to better address the endogeneity. 
From the results of this study, it is recommended to give more program aid to LMICs 
rather than LDCs, because LMICs have more capability to fulfill the development-oriented 
conditionality. As earlier urged by Sumner and Mallett (2013), “Aid 2.0” in the future should 
be made through close cooperation between donors and middle-income countries. Whereas, 
LDCs can be more adaptive to the traditional project aids, and can be much better off with 
HDI-related projects. In other words, future aid commitments should be made in 
consideration of the different income and governance levels of the recipients, and the 
interaction of these features with different aid modalities. Aid delivery modality is to be 
prudentially decided based on that. 
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Appendix: List of recipients grouped by income level 
No. Country Region 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
1 Benin Sub Saharan Africa 
2 Burundi Sub Saharan Africa 
3 Ethiopia Sub Saharan Africa 
4 Madagascar Sub Saharan Africa 
5 Malawi Sub Saharan Africa 
6 Mali Sub Saharan Africa 
7 Mozambique Sub Saharan Africa 
8 Niger Sub Saharan Africa 
9 Rwanda Sub Saharan Africa 
10 Senegal Sub Saharan Africa 
11 Sierra Leone Sub Saharan Africa 
12 Tanzania Sub Saharan Africa 
13 Uganda Sub Saharan Africa 
14 Zambia Sub Saharan Africa 
15 Lao PDR Far East Asia 
Low Middle Income Countries (LMICs) 
16 Cabo Verde Sub Saharan Africa 
17 Ghana Sub Saharan Africa 
18 Honduras North & Central America 
19 Guyana South America 
20 Vietnam Far East Asia 
21 Armenia South & Central Asia 
22 Georgia South & Central Asia 
23 Kyrgyz Republic South & Central Asia 
24 Pakistan South & Central Asia 
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